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Abstract
This paper proposes the notion of ε-stability to conciliate Pareto efficiency and
fairness. We propose the use of a centralized procedure, the Exchanging Places
Mechanism. It endows students a position according with the Gale and Shapley
students optimal stable matching as tentative allocation and allows the student to
trade their positions. We show that the final allocation is ε-stable, i.e. efficient,
fair and immune to any justifiable objection that students can formulate.
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1. Introduction
In many countries local authorities coordinate the admission process to
allocate the children, entering public education, a place in a primary school.
Different cities use distinct procedures to do such a task. Almost all of then
take into account the parents’ interests for the schools and build priority
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as preference for, otherwise indifferent, centers. When this priority list is
not enough to break all relevant ties the municipalities use a sort of random
process to break the ties.
The usual way to deal with the problem of how students would be pri-
oritized is solved by building a function that associates each student a score
for each school. The scoring functions, or the priority orderings they induce,
are constructed to reduce the well-known efficiency-equity trade-off (Roth,
1982). First, to reach a (Rawlsian) efficiency, when allocating places to stu-
dents, the Public Administration tries to reduce the cost in which households
incur, due to the children’s attendance to the school by accurately describing
school areas and other relevant criteria, as the presence of siblings. Second,
and once efficient equivalence classes has been established, a fair lottery is
used to break ties inside each such an efficiency category. The fact that all
the students have the same (ex-ante) probability of being ranked at any po-
sition, inside their class, induces a kind of ex-ante internal equity relative to
each efficiency category.
Therefore, we can think that students’ priorities are decided following an
efficient intra-equitable criterion. Nevertheless, it is hard to argue that this
criterion is fully equitable since some agents are ex-ante prioritized, relative
to the final ranking. Furthermore, the particular procedure use to match
students and schools’ places, could induce inefficient allocations.
The literature on this issue concentrates on three allocation mechanisms:
the Boston mechanism, the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism and the Top
Trading Cycle.
The first one or “Boston mechanism” coincides with the “Now-or-Never
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mechanism” introduced by Alcalde (1996) to implement the set of stable
allocations in undominated Nash equilibria. The main properties that this
mechanism exhibits are:
(1) When agents do not play strategically, i.e. when the preferences that
they declare are their true preferences, the allocation it suggests is Pareto
efficient.
(2) When agents act strategically,3 the expected allocations are stable. Fur-
thermore, any stable allocation can be decentralized by a Nash equilib-
rium.
The second mechanism that has been explored is the Student-Optimal Stable
mechanism, SOSM hence for, which coincides with the realization of the De-
ferred Acceptance algorithm in which students send proposals to the schools.
This mechanism, introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962), always selects a
stable allocation. Moreover, all the students (weakly) prefer this allocation
to any other stable allocation. Furthermore, when this mechanism is used,
students have no interest on playing strategically.
The third mechanism was proposed, under the name of “Top Trading Cy-
cles” mechanism, TTCM henceforth, by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003).
It is inspired in the homonym algorithm used by Shapley and Scarf (1974) to
prove the existence of stable allocations in their “Housing Markets” model. It
3The result by Alcalde (1996) is established for undominated strategies. This is because
in the framework analyzed in this paper, agents in both sides of the market are allowed
to select strategically their actions. Nevertheless, in the problem modeled in the present
paper, since schools are not allowed to act strategically, there is no need to assume that
agents use undominated strategies to reach the result.
3
is remarkable that this mechanism always selects Pareto efficient allocations
and that students have no interest on misrepresent their true characteristics.
Nevertheless, the way in which it has been described yields to consider the
TTCM as hardly used in practice. In our opinion, it is not easy to convince
the students (or their relatives) about the intuition behind such an allocation
procedure.
The redesign that has been introduced in several markets has proposed
the SOSM as the best option for school markets, i.e. for almost one sided-
markets with indifferences. However, as Erdil and Ergin (2008), Kesten
(2010) and Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2009) agrees, the welfare lost due to select
the SOSM can be troubledly large. The alternative is to move to a Pareto
efficient mechanism such the TTCM. However, it can be argued against the
TTCM that some priorities as, for example, the priority obtaining for having
siblings attending the same school, should not be exchangeable. It can also
be said that the TTCM dilutes the impact of priorities that do not belongs
to parents but to the district. Kesten (2010) address this problem proposing
an intermediate approach: an efficiency adjusted SOSM, the Efficiency Ad-
justed Deferred Acceptance Mechanism or EADAM, that allows a student to
consent to waive a certain priority that has no effect on his assignment.
In this paper we present an alternative way to deal with the problem. We
propose a new solution concept, to be called ε-stability. Our solution concept
is inspired in the usual way in which Public Decision-Makers act. In fact,
what it seems to be the main objective for the Public School Administrators
is to allocate students optimally. This can be one of the main reasons sup-
porting systems like the (former) mechanism used in the Boston area. The
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idea behind ε-stability aims to improve the inefficient solution obtained if we
impose the equity criterion to be fulfilled.
The concept of ε-stability adapts the idea of exchange-proofness of an
allocation, introduced by Alcalde (1995), to the context of School Allocation
Problems. The purpose of such a notion is to guarantee the efficiency of
allocations. To introduce ε-stability, let us consider that each student has
been allocated a place in some school. And let us assume that there is
no student justifiably envying some other student’s place. Under such a
consideration, one might well assume that students owns or have some rights
on their places and that they are free to exchange their rights if they wished
to. A solution is ε-stable if no group of students have interest on exchanging
their school places. The way to reach our objective is simple. We start by
allocating each student at the best school she can reach, provided that the
allocation must be stable. This job can be done by applying the students-
propose deferred algorithm designed by Gale and Shapley (1962). Then, let
us consider the Walrasian market where agents are the students, commodities
are the schools’ places; and each agent’s initial endowment is her best stable
allocation, as previously stated. This market has the formal structure of a
“Housing Market”, as modeled by Shapley and Scarf (1974). Therefore, let
us allow the students to exchange their places. As a consequence of this
interaction an efficient allocation is reached, in which all the students will
be, at least, as well as in any stable allocation and where there will no be
additional incentives to trade. This allocation would be ε-stable.
When analyzind the related literature, the paper by Balinski and So¨nmez
(1999) can be viewed as the starting point on a large, recent, literature on
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solutions for the so called student allocation problem.4 Balinski and So¨nmez
(1999) formalized the way in which students should be allocated to the dif-
ferent available positions in the education system. What it is important in
their model, and imposes a new way to explore how to study the problem,
related to the Matching Theory introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962), is
that agents in a side of the market (schools, colleges, institutions, etc.) have
no preferences on which their mates are. These agents just declare some lists
describing students’ priorities when the allocation of some place is contested.
These priorities are obtained to reach allocation efficiency. For instance, at
primary school level, when students can be considered, from an academic
point of view, as undistinguished, the only variables that are considered lie
on family background (related or not to the schools) as walking distance, sib-
ling, per-capita household income, etc.; for higher education, since students’
characteristics are differentiated, students’ academic skills are used to decide
priorities. Note that, from a Social perspective, the use of academic skills as
a relevant variable lies on allocative efficiency. This is because the success of
students’ effort is more likely if they exhibit the appropriate skills to follow
some particular studies.
Given theses primitives, Balinski and So¨nmez (1999) provided a way to
associate a solution concept in this family of problems to the classical notion
of stability introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962). This idea is nice, original
4Some authors made a formal distinction between the model by Balinski and So¨nmez
(1999) and the school allocation problem presented in Ergin and So¨nmez (2006). Never-
theless, for our purposes, when the schools do not act strategically, and their only role is
providing educational services, we can treat both literatures as coincident.
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and has been useful to introduce some important reforms in the admission
systems used at the Elementary School in some areas in the US.5 The key no-
tion introduced by Balinski and So¨nmez (1999) is their fairness criterion.6 It
implicitly assumes that some students are the usufructuary of certain places.
Nevertheless, in their model, students are not free to exchange their rights
on using the places. However there is evidence that agents are often allow
to improve the initial allocation by exchanging their rights. This evidence is
abundant both in the ranges of civil servants and army. For instance, civil
servants are allowed to exchange their places in Spain,7 and a similar ex-
change can be done in the US Army under the so-called Enlisted Assignment
Exchanges (SWAPS).8 And, following a similar spirit, i.e. allowing agents to
exchange goods they are not the owners, but they retain some rights, it can
be found some socially accepted systems like several international students
exchange programs, or the recent kidney exchange9 programs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
basic framework and provides some definitions which are classical in the lit-
5See, for instance the papers by Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2009), relative to the New York
City High School Match, or Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2006) for the Boston Public School
Match.
6This criterion is also called non justified envy by Haeringer and Klijn (2009). We
consider both expressions as equivalent throughout the paper.
7Art. 62 in the Spanish law that rules civil servants or Law 315/1964, B.O.E 15.02.1964.
This regulation can be obtained from http://www.ua.es/oia/es/legisla/funcion.htm.
8The reader is gathered to http://usmilitary.about.com/od/armyassign/a/swap for fur-
ther information on this matter.
9Transplant services in Ronald Reagan UCLA Medical Center provides some informa-
tion via the web page http://transplants.ucla.edu/body.cfm?id=112
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erature. Section 3 proposes how to modify the allocation system, provided
that colleges are free to exhibit any way to prioritize students. Section 4
introduces a discussion on the equilibrium concept. It also proposes a pro-
cedure selecting, for each School Allocation Problem, a ϕ-stable allocation.
The way in which this mechanism is described points out how the actual
Boston system might be re-reformed. Section 5 studies the strategic prop-
erties of the mechanism. Conclusions are gathered to Section 6. Finally, all
the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. The School Allocation Problem
This section is devoted to introduce some formalisms related to the School
Allocation Problem. This family of problems faces two set of non-empty
disjoint agents to be called Students and Schools. The set of Students is
denoted by S, and has n individuals, i.e. S = {s1, . . . , si, . . . , sn}. The set of
Schools is denoted by C, and has m elements, i.e. C = {c1, . . . , cj, . . . , cm}.
Each school has a number of seats (or places), to be distributed among
the students, that will be called its capacity. Let qcj ≥ 1 denote school cj’s
capacity; and let Q =
{
qc1 , . . . , qcj , . . . , qcm
}
the vector summarizing schools’
capacities. Schools are also endowed a priorities linear ordering over the set
of students. Let picj ∈ Rn be the students’ ordering for school cj and Π the
(m× n)-matrix summarizing these priorities. Formally, picj is described as
a n-dimensional vector such that for each k ∈ {1, . . . , n} there is a unique
student si for which picjsi = k; given this description, the j-th row for matrix
Π coincides with vector picj .
Note that, under our description, no school would consider a student to
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be inadmissible. Notice that most schools systems impose such a restriction
in the way that the schools rank their potential students. Nevertheless, our
model might capture the possibility of a student to be inadmissible at a low
cost: just by introducing a new variable for each school defining the priority
level of the last admissible student.
On the other side, each student has linear preferences over the set of
schools, so that no student will consider two different schools as equivalent
(or indifferent), and no school is neither considered as inadmissible by any
student. Let ρsi denote the schools’ ranking induced by student si’s prefer-
ences,10 and Φ the (n×m)-matrix summarizing these rankings. Note that
our model assumes that each student considers all the school as admissible.11
Nevertheless, we can also reformulate this model by assuming that each stu-
dent might consider some schools as unacceptable. The essence of this paper
is the same in both frameworks.
Therefore, a School Allocation Problem can be described by listing the
elements above: SAP = {S, C; Φ,Π, Q}. We will say that a School Allocation
Problem is non-scarce whenever there is enough places to allocate all the
students ∑
cj∈C
qcj ≥ n.
Given a School Allocation Problem, SAP , a solution for it is an applica-
tion µ that matches students and schools’ places. Such a correspondence is
10I.e., ρsicj = 3 indicates that student si considers that cj is her third-best school.
11Here, we can also invoke legislative regulations establishing that school attendance is
compulsory for the children of certain ages.
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called a matching. Formally,
Definition 1. A matching for SAP , a School Allocation Problem, is a cor-
respondence µ, applying S ∪ C into itself, such that:
1. For each si in S, if µ (si) 6= si, then µ (si) ∈ C;
2. For each cj in C, µ (cj) ⊆ S, and |µ (cj)| ≤ qcj ;12 and
3. For each si in S, and any cj in C, µ (si) = cj if, and only if, si ∈ µ (cj).
The central solution concept used through the literature is stability, as
defined by Balinski and So¨nmez (1999). This stability notion coincides with
the pair-wise stability introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962). Under our
considerations (i.e., each school is acceptable for any student and vice versa),
stability is defined as follows.
Definition 2. A matching for SAP , say µ, is said stable if there is no
student-school pair (si, cj) such that
1. µ (si) = si, or ρsicj < ρsiµ(si); and
2. |µ (cj)| < qcj , or picjsi < picjsh for some sh ∈ µ (cj).
Throughout this paper, we adopt the convention that ρsiµ(si) = m + 1
whenever µ (si) = si.
The idea of instability comes basically from the notion of justified envy.
(See Haeringer and Klijn, 2009). Let us consider a matching µ, and let us
assume that student si prefers to study at school cj rather that developing
her educative formation at her actual school µ (si). If si has a priority higher
12Throughout this paper |T | will denote the cardinality of set T .
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than some of the actual students attending school cj, or this school is still
having some vacant, she might claim that the allocation process has been
unfair.
A second notion that has also been analyzed in this framework is that
of efficiency. To introduce appropriately this concept, let us remember that
the only role for the schools is to provide educational services needed by the
students. Therefore the natural notion of efficiency, as proposed by Balinski
and So¨nmez (1999) for this framework, is Pareto efficiency (from the students’
point of view).
Definition 3. Given a School Allocation Problem, SAP , we say that match-
ing µ is Pareto efficient if for any other matching µ′ there is a student, say
si, such that
ρsiµ(si) < ρsiµ′(si).
Note that, for any non-scarce School Allocation Problem, stability and/or
efficiency of a matching µ implies that, for each student si, µ (si) ∈ C.
A matching mechanism is a regular procedure that associates to each
School Allocation Problem a matching for such a problem. A matching
mechanismM is said to be stable if, for any given problem, it always selects
a stable matching. Similarly, we say that a matching mechanism is Pareto
efficient whenever its outcome is always Pareto efficient, related to its input.
It is easy to see that there are stable matching mechanisms. In fact, any
of the versions of the deferred-acceptance algorithms proposed by Gale and
Shapley (1962) associates a stable matching for the related School Allocation
Problem. On the other hand, the now-or-never mechanism introduced by
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Alcalde (1996) always selects a Pareto efficient matching when the proposals
are made by the students.13
The first question that we deal with is the possibility of designing match-
ing mechanisms that always select stable and Pareto efficient allocations. As
Proposition 1 states it is a well known result that it might be an impos-
sible task to conciliate the “fairness” notion involving stability and Pareto
efficiency.
Proposition 1. There is no matching mechanism selecting a stable and
Pareto efficient allocation for each School Allocation Problem.
What Proposition 1 suggests is the need of proposing a new solution con-
cept that accurately combines the notions of fairness, reflected by stability,
and Pareto efficiency.
3. ε-Stability: A New Solution Concept
In this section we propose a new solution concept for the School Allocation
Problem. It tries to reduce the trade-off between equity (in terms of stability)
and efficiency. The central idea to reach our objective is just to restrict which
are the statements, made by some student, that are considered “admissible”
to induce instability of an allocation.
Following a large tradition on cooperative games, it is fairly important
to be precise when defining which objections (made by a set of agents) are
admissible and which are not. This is the essence of the concept of Bargaining
13The now-or-never mechanism is also known as the Boston mechanism because it was
used in the Boston school district.
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Set introduced by Aumann and Maschler (1964), and the solutions concepts
that appeared following that paper. The idea behind the Bargaining Set is
that any agent is free to formulate an objection against an allocation. What
she should do is to propose an alternative allocation fitting some properties.
Then, if an agent formally presents an objection against an allocation, any
other agent might formulate an objection against this new proposal in the
same fashion that previously did the former agent. That is, any other agent
might counter-object. What ϕ-stability of an allocation imposes is that:
1. no agent will object against this allocation, or
2. any objection presented by an agent will be counter-objected.
In this paper we capture the idea behind stability considering as valid
only objections against an allocation that cannot be counter-objected. To
illustrate our proposal, let us analyze the following example.
Example 1. Let us consider the following School Allocation Problem. S =
{1, 2, 3}; C = {a, b, c}; Q = (1, 1, 1); and the ranking and priorities matrices
are
Φ =

1 3 2
2 3 1
2 3 1
 , and Π =

3 2 1
2 1 3
1 3 2

Note that matching µ, with µ (1) = a; µ (2) = b; and µ (3) = c is not stable.
This is because student 2 claims that she has priority, related to student 1,
for studying at school a. Now, let us propose to student 2 the following deal:
“If you are able to propose a matching, preferred by you to
µ, and no other student would claim that the new proposal is
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unfair (as you did when µ was proposed), the new matching will
be implemented.”
The conclusion will be that student 2 will not be able to propose an
alternative matching.
Therefore, and adapting the arguments above relative the Bargaining Set,
the process that ϕ-stability captures can be informally described as follows.
Let us consider a matching µ. Then, any student is free to claim that such an
allocation is, from her point of view, unfair. Nevertheless, her criticism has
to be supported by proposing an alternative matching. The new proposal is
accepted only if no student is able to show, using identical arguments, that
the new matching unfair too.
Definition 4. [Fair Objection]
Let SAP be a School Allocation Problem, and let µ be a matching for such
a problem. A fair objection from student si ∈ S against µ is a pair (si, µ′)
such that
1. ρsiµ′(si) < ρsiµ(si), and
2. |µ′ (µ′ (si))| < qµ′(µ′(si)), or piµ′(si)si < piµ′(si)sh for some sh ∈ µ′ (µ′ (si)).
Definition 5. [Counter-Objection]
Let (si, µ
′) be a fair objection against matching µ. A counter-objection from
student sh against (si, µ
′) is a pair (sh, µ′′) that constitutes a fair objection
against matching µ′.
We say that (si, µ
′) is a justified fair objection against µ if it cannot be
counter-objected
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Definition 6. [ϕ-Stability]
Let SAP be a School Allocation Problem. We say that matching µ is ϕ-stable
if any objection against it can be counter-objected.
Therefore, the idea of ϕ-stability for µ is that when some student might
claim that such a matching is unfair, she is unable to propose an alternative
solution that no student would consider an unfair matching.
Note that, for any School Allocation Problem, SAP , the set of ϕ-stable
matchings is a super-set of the set of stable matchings. Therefore, the next
statement follows.
Proposition 2. Let SAP be a School Allocation Problem. Then, it has a
ϕ-stable matching.
What it is also relevant is that, in general, there are School Allocation
Problems having ϕ-stable matchings that are not stable. Notice that match-
ing µ, proposed in Example 1, is unstable, but it is ϕ-stable for the related
problem.
The central solution concept that we propose in this section, ε-stability,
comes from the confluence of two solution ideas, namely Pareto efficiency
and ϕ-stability.
Definition 7. [ε-Stability]
Let SAP be a School Allocation Problem. We say that matching µ is ε-stable
if it is Pareto efficient and ϕ-stable for SAP .
The next question that we deal with is the existence of ε-stable alloca-
tions. Even though that the sets of Stable and Pareto efficient matchings
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might not intersect (Proposition 1), when we concentrate on ϕ-stable alloca-
tions, instead on stable ones, such an intersection is always non-empty.
Theorem 1. Let SAP be a School Allocation Problem. Then, it has a
matching µ which is ε-stable.
4. The Exchanging Places Mechanism and ε-Stability
This section proposes an algorithm that always selects a ε-stable match-
ing. Therefore it can be seen as a constructive proof for Theorem 1.
The mechanism that we propose can be introduced as a combination
of two algorithms. The first one is the classic students-proposing deferred
acceptance algorithm. The second one follows the idea reflected in the Gale’s
Top Trading Cycle, introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974).
Since the deferred acceptance algorithm is well-known in the literature,
we concentrate on a description of how the second algorithm works. First,
we need some additional definitions.
Definition 8. Let SAP be a School Allocation Problem, and µ a matching.
For si given, let δsi a ranking of the set of students.
14 We say that δsi µ-agrees
ρsi if, and only if,
1. δsisi < δsish , for each sh 6= si such that µ (sh) /∈ C,
2. δsisi < δsish , for each sh 6= si such that µ (sh) = µ (si), and
14This is, for each k ∈ {1, . . . , n} there is one, and only one, student sh such that
δsish = k.
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3. for each two students sh and sl, with µ (sh) , µ (sl) ∈ C \ µ (si),
δsish < δsislwhenever ρsiµ(sh) < ρsiµ(sl).
By extension, if we denote by Σ the matrix whose i-th row is δsi , we say
that Σ µ-agrees Φ whenever for each student si, δsi µ-agrees ρsi .
Definition 9. [Students’ Incidence Matrix]
Let S be the set of students, and let Σ be a matrix of students’ rankings,
whose i-th row represents si’s ranking. For each subset of students S ′ ⊆ S
we define its incidence matrix as the (|S ′| × |S ′|)-matrix that associates, to
each si and sh in S ′, the value
IΣS′ (si, sh) =
 1 if δsish < δsislfor each sl ∈ S ′ \ {sh}0 otherwise
Definition 10. Let Σ be a matrix of students’ rankings, and S ′ ⊆ S be a
subset of students. A Cycle for the incidence matrix IΣS′ is a (non-empty)
ordered set of students in S ′, {s1, . . . , si, . . . , st} such that, for each i ≤ t−1,
IΣS′
(
si, si+1
)
= IΣS′
(
st, s1
)
= 1.
Note that, since for each subset of students S ′ each row of its incidence
matrix has a unique element whose value is 1, it is easy to see that
1. IΣS′ has, at least one cycle, and
2. each student si ∈ S ′ is involved in, at most, one cycle.
We are now ready to introduce the workings for the Top Trading Cycle
algorithm in our framework.
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Definition 11. [The µ-Σ-Top Trading Cycle Algorithm]
Let SAP be a School Allocation Problem, and µ a matching. Let Σ be a
matrix µ-agreeing the students’ ranking matrix Φ. The µ-Σ-Top Trading
Cycle algorithm, µ-Σ-TTCA henceforth, works as follows:
(Step 1) Let us consider the students’ incidence matrix IΣS , and let S1 be the
students belonging to a cycle for IΣS . Then associate each student
si ∈ S1 her mate
µTTC (si) = µ (sh) , where sh satisfies I
Σ
S (si, sh) = 1.
Let S1 = S \ S1. If S1 = ∅ the algorithm ends, and matching µTTC is
implemented. Otherwise, go to Step 2.
(Step k) Let us consider the students’ incidence matrix IΣSk−1 , and let Sk ⊆ Sk−1
be the students belonging to a cycle for IΣSk−1 . Then associate each
student si ∈ Sk her mate
µTTC (si) = µ (sh) where sh satisfies I
Σ
Sk−1 (si, sh) = 1.
Let Sk = Sk−1 \ Sk. If Sk = ∅ the algorithm ends, and matching µTTC ,
as described throughout steps 1 to k, is implemented. Otherwise, go
to Step k + 1.
The algorithm ends at the step t for which St = ∅.
Note that, since the set of students is finite and, for each step k, |Sk+1| <
|Sk|, this algorithm always ends in a finite number of steps.
Relative to the output of the µ-Σ-TTCA, for any given µ and each matrix
Σ, we can guarantee that the following properties are satisfied:
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1. µTTC is Pareto efficient;
2. for each student si,
ρsiµTTC(si) ≤ ρsiµ(si).
3. µ = µTTC if, and only if, the former matching is Pareto efficient; and
4. if students are asked to reveal their rankings to implement matching
µTTC , they will obtain no advantage from misrepresenting their rank-
ings.
Note that the above properties can be seen as a conclusion derived from
theorems 4 and 5 in Alcalde-Unzu and Molis (2009).
We can now establish the following result.
Theorem 2. Let SAP be a School Allocation Problem, and µSO its student
optimal stable matching. Let ΣSO be a matrix µSO-agreeing the students’
rankings matrix Φ. Then the matching µTTC obtained by applying the µSO-
ΣSO-TTCA is ε-stable.
Summarizing the process that we have introduced in this section, let us
propose a formal description for the Exchanging Places Mechanism. To de-
scribe how this procedure operates, let fix the set of students S, and define,
for each student si, an exchanging-priorities vector ωsi that will be under-
stood as a rule for prioritizing exchanges.15 In other words, let us imagine
15ωsi can be determined by the local school committee when establishing a students
ordering to be used for breaking ties in schools’ scores. For instance, and in order to make
up for the draw effect, each student’s vector ωsi might represent the ordering reversing
the draw result.
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that student si is located a place at school cj, and she would like to exchange
her place to some student attending to school ct. What ωsi describes is how
si orders the students having a place at ct to (sequentially) propose them
such an exchange. Given this vector for each student, we summarize this
information by defining a matrix of rankings Ω.
The “Exchanging Places Mechanism” operates as follows. Given a School
Allocation Problem, SAP , and matrix Ω, let µSO be the students optimal
stable matching for SAP , and ΣSO a matrix µSO-agreeing students’ rankings
matrix Φ, which is obtained by preserving the priorities established in Ω.
Then, apply the µ-Σ-TTCA for µ = µSO and Σ = ΣSO. The result of this
procedure is the outcome for the Exchanging Places Mechanism.
Definition 12. [The Exchanging Places Mechanism]
We define the Exchanging Places Mechanism, EPM henceforth, as the func-
tion that associates to each School Allocation Problem, SAP , and (n× n)-
ranking matrix, Ω,16 the matching µ∗ which is obtained by applying the
µ-Σ-TTCA, where
1. µ is the student optimal stable matching for SAP , and
2. Σ is the matrix µ-agreeing the students’ ranking matrix Φ that, for each
si and any two students sh and s` in S \ {si} such that µ (sh) = µ (s`),
Σih < Σi` if, and only if Ωih < Ωi`.
To conclude this section, let us propose the following example to show
how the EPM works.
16By “ranking matrix” we mean that it satisfies that for each row i, and any two different
columns j, and h, Ωij 6= Ωih.
20
Example 2. Let us consider the following Schools Allocation Problem. S =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, C = {a, b, c, d}, the capacity for each school is 2; and
the Rankings and Priorities matrices are
Φ =

2 1 3 4
2 4 1 3
3 2 1 4
4 2 3 1
1 4 2 3
1 2 3 4
1 2 4 3
2 1 3 4

; and Π =

2 3 8 1 7 4 6 5
6 2 1 5 8 4 3 7
7 5 6 8 2 3 1 4
8 5 3 4 1 2 7 6

Let us assume that, for each student, the vector of exchanging priorities is
ω = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. The EPM proceeds as follows.
1. Let us calculate the student optimal stable matching, µSO. The ap-
plication of the students-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is
summarized in the following table17
17A row in the table indicates the applications that each school receives at such a step.
The students marked in red are the ones whose application is refused, whereas the students
marked in green are tentatively accepted by the school.
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Step a b c d
1 5, 6, 7 1, 8 2, 3 4
2 6, 7 1, 8 2, 3, 5 4
3 6, 7 1, 3, 8 2, 5 4
4 6, 7, 8 1, 3 2, 5 4
5 6, 8 1, 3, 7 2, 5 4
6 1, 6, 8 3, 7 2, 5 4
7 1, 6 3, 7 2, 5, 8 4
8 1, 2, 6 3, 7 5, 8 4
9 1, 2 3, 6, 7 5, 8 4
10 1, 2 3, 7 5, 6, 8 4
11 1, 2 3, 7 5, 6 4, 8
µSO := 1, 2 3, 7 5, 6 4, 8
2. Matrix ΣMO is the following
ΣMO =

3 4 1 7 5 6 2 8
4 3 7 5 1 2 8 6
5 6 3 7 1 2 4 8
7 8 3 1 5 6 4 2
1 2 7 5 3 4 8 6
1 2 3 7 6 5 4 8
1 2 4 5 7 8 3 6
3 4 1 8 5 6 2 7

;
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3. and the successive incidence matrices are18
IΣ
SO
S =

0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0

; and thus S1 = {2, 6, 7, 8} ;
IΣ
SO
S1 =

0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
 ; and thus S2 = {7, 8} ;
IΣ
SO
S2 =
 1 0
1 0
 ; and thus S3 = {8} .
Since S3 is a singleton, matrix IΣSOS3 will have a cycle containing the unique
element in such a set.
Therefore, and following the order in which cycles has been reached, we have
that
(1.1) student 1 will get the place that µMO assigns to student 3; the latter
will take the one assigned to student 5, which will obtain the place that
18Each cycle in a matrix is marked by using one color (red or blue) for all the elements
belonging to that cycle.
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1 got;
(1.2) student 4 will keep the place that µMO assigned to her;
(2.1) students 2 and 6 will exchange the seats that µMO assigned to them;
(3.1) student 7 will retain her place; and
(4.1) since no student prefers 8’s place to her own, this agent will remain in
her place.
To conclude this example, and with the aim of presenting a comparative for
the application of some allocation procedures, relative to the data proposed
in the present example, let us consider the following table. It associates each
student two items: the school in which she gets a place (in blue), and the
position of such school in the student’s ranking (in red).
Comparing Systems
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Boston Mechanism b 1 c 1 c 1 d 1 d 3 a 1 a 1 b 1
Top Trading Cycles b 1 c 1 c 1 d 1 a 1 b 2 a 1 d 4
Student Optimal a 2 a 2 b 2 d 1 c 2 c 3 b 2 d 4
Exchange Places b 1 c 1 c 1 d 1 a 1 a 1 b 2 d 4
Let us note that,
(1) The solution proposed by the Boston mechanism is not ε-stable. In
fact, student 5 might fairly object this solution by proposing the student
optimal stable matching. Since the last allocation is stable, no student
will be able to counter-object;
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(2) relative to the proposal by the TTCM, and comparing it to the one
suggested by the EPM, let us observe that both allocations are effi-
cient. The main difference can be founded in a fairness criterion. Let
us concentrate on schools a, and b that are the ones in which both
allocations differ. Note that, in the former allocation, student 6 envies
students 5 and 7; and it is justifiable; for the latter allocation, 7 is the
only student justifiable envying another student. She envies 5’s allo-
cation. Therefore, form a cardinal point of view, the outcome for the
EPM is ‘fairer’ than the allocation proposed by the TTCM;
(3) finally, when comparing the SOSM and the EPM, it is easy to see that
the latter Pareto-dominates the former. Moreover, both mechanisms
induce ϕ-stable allocations.
Notice that the EPM does not coincides with the EADAM proposed by
Kesten (2010) as we can see in the following example.
Example 3. Let us consider the following School Allocation Problem. S =
{1, 2, 3, 4}; C = {a, b, c}; Q = (1, 2, 1) ; and the ranking and priorities matri-
ces are
Φ =

2 1 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
 , and Π =

1 2 3 4
4 1 2 3
4 3 2 1

Notice that if student 1 trades with student 2, the allocation is the one
provide by EDAM however if she trades with 3 the allocation is different an
both are possible allocations of the EPM.
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5. Strategy-Proofness
As expected being efficient the EPM proposed for the School Allocation
Problem is not strategy proof.
Example 4. Let us consider the following School Allocation Problem. S =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}; C = {a, b, c, d, e}; Q = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1); and the ranking and prior-
ities matrices are19
Φ =

1 2 − − 3
− 1 2 − 3
2 − 1 − 3
1 5 4 3 2
1 2 3 4 5

, and Π =

3 − 1 − 2
1 3 − − 2
5 2 4 1 3
− − − − −
− − − 1 2

The student optimal stable matching is µSO (1) = b, µSO (2) = µSO (3) =
a, µSO (4) = e, and µSO (5) = d. When we apply the TTC we obtain
µSO−TTC (1) = a, µSO−TTC (2) = b, µSO−TTC (3) = c, µSO−TTC (4) = e,
and µSO−TTC (5) = d. If student 4 misreport her preferences by setting
ρ′4 = (1, 5, 2, 4, 3), then when applying the EPM we reach that
1. µSO (1) = b, µSO (2) = e, µSO (3) = a, µSO (4) = c, and µSO (5) = d;
2. and when we apply the TTC the allocation becomes µSO−TTC (1) = b,
µSO−TTC (2) = e, µSO−TTC (3) = c, µSO−TTC (4) = a, and µSO−TTC (5) =
d.
19In the next tables, when the ranking and/or priority is not completely determined, it
is understood that any ranking and/or priority agreeing our description are likely valid to
show our result.
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Therefore the mechanism is not strategy proof.
This fact is closely related with some previous results. First, Erdil and Er-
gin (2008) show that no student-optimal stable mechanism is strategy proof.
Kesten (2010) shows that when preferences are strict, there is no strategy-
proof and Pareto efficient mechanism that Pareto dominates the deferred ac-
ceptance mechanism. Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2009) provided a tighter bound,
i.e., even when the efficiency requirement is relaxed, no strategy-proof mech-
anism can Pareto improve upon deferred acceptance with some tie-breaking,
were the preferences strict or not. We find then that there is a trade-off
between efficiency and strategy-proofness.
6. Concluding Remarks
Let us start this section by referring the reform hold in Boston (Citing
Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005, Section IV).
A memorandum from Superintendent Payzant in December
2004 states that BPS plans to change the computerized process
used to assign students to schools. Although the task-force re-
port recommended that BPS adopt the TTC assignment algo-
rithm, the School Committee is interested in simulations of both
mechanisms and in understanding the extent of preference ma-
nipulation under the Boston mechanism. They are also thinking
through their philosophical position on the trade-off between sta-
bility and efficiency.
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This interest for defining a philosophical position on the trade-off between
stability and efficiency is at the origin of a modification in the mechanism used
in the Boston Area, decided by July 2005. (See Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2006).
As these authors mention, the solution was to adopt a deferred acceptance
mechanism because it is strategy-proof. Nevertheless, as we have pointed out
in the present paper, this solution is far from solving the trade-off which is
at the origin of this reform. In fact the use of such a solution can be justified
because it considers that stability is the central issue. If, moreover, the best
that agents can do is to reveal their true characteristics, it is straightforward
to conclude, as the Boston School Committee did, that the SOSM would be
adopted.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a way for avoiding the
efficiency-equity dilemma. Our approach to escape to this trade-off between
stability and efficiency comes from a reinterpretation of the instability notion.
In this sense, the additional reform that would be introduced in systems
focusing on stability is allowing students to exchange the places that were
allocated to them in the actual system. Thus, when the Public authority does
not want to restrict the schools freedom when prioritizing students, the EPM
can be introduced to minimize the (inevitable) trade-off between efficiency
and equity.
A further aspect that can be used to promote the use of the EPM comes
from the arguments given in Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2006). What these au-
thors report, concerning the recent changes introduced by the Boston School
Committee, is:
As far as we know, it is the first time that “strategyproof-
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ness,” a central concept in the game theory literature on mecha-
nism design, has been adopted as a public policy concern related
to transparency, fairness, and equal access to public facilities.
(Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2006, pg. 2)
Nevertheless, strategy-proofness was not considered as a “sufficient con-
dition” justifying a modification in the mechanism used to allocate schools
places among students. In particular, the TTCM, introduced by Abdulka-
dirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) was not considered by the Boston School Com-
mittee as a satisfactory proposal to modify the former system. This mecha-
nism is strategy-proof and selects efficient allocations. When comparing the
TTCM and the SOSM, which is also strategy-proof, Abdulkadirog˘lu et al.
(2006) conclude the following:
While TTC is a Pareto efficient mechanism when only stu-
dents are considered, and the student-proposing deferred accep-
tance mechanism is not, the former does not Pareto dominate
the latter. One implication is, based on a stronger efficiency no-
tion (such as a cardinal efficiency notion relying on the rank order
of schools) the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism
may perform better than the TTC for some problems. For exam-
ple, the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism may
assign more students to their first choices than TTC. Moreover
while each Nash equilibrium outcome of the complete information
preference revelation game induced by the Boston mechanism is
weakly Pareto dominated by each dominant-strategy equilibrium
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outcome of the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism
(Ergin and So¨nmez, 2006), equilibrium outcomes induced by the
Boston mechanism and TTC are not Pareto ranked. (Abdulka-
dirog˘lu et al., 2006, pg. 10)
Given the above comparison, we can conclude that our EPM performs
better than all the three mechanisms considered in the literature, namely
the TTC, the SOSM and the Boston mechanisms. The reason is that, using
the arguments by Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2006), and taking into account that
the EPM Pareto dominates the SOSM, we get
1. The EPM never assigns less students to their first choices than the
SOSM do, and
2. when students do not act strategically, the EPM weakly Pareto domi-
nates the SOSM.
APPENDIX
I. A Proof for Proposition 1
To prove Proposition 1, let us consider the following School Allocation
Problem.
S = {1, 2, 3} ; C = {a, b, c} ; Q = (1, 1, 1); and the ranking and priorities
matrices are
Φ =

1 3 2
2 3 1
2 3 1
 , and Π =

3 2 1
2 1 3
1 3 2

Note that in such a problem there is only one stable matching, µ, such
that µ (1) = c; µ (2) = b; and µ (3) = a. Nevertheless, µ fails to be Pareto
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efficient since µ′ defined as µ′ (1) = a; µ′ (2) = b; and µ′ (3) = c, Pareto
dominates µ.  
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II. A Proof for Theorem 2
To prove Theorem 2, let us consider a School Allocation Problem, SAP ,
and let µSO its student optimal stable matching. By Mart´ınez et al. (2001),
we know that for any matching µ′, if ρsiµ′(si) < ρsiµSO(si) for some student ci,
then µ′ is unstable.
Now, let ΣSO be a matrix µSO-agreeing Φ, and µTTC the matching ob-
tained by applying the µSO-ΣSO-TTC algorithm. By Alcalde-Unzu and Molis
(2009), Theorem 4, we have that µTTC is efficient. Moreover, Corollary 3 in
Alcalde-Unzu and Molis (2009) also establishes that, for each student si,
ρsiµTTC(si) ≤ ρsiµMO(si).
Now, let us assume that µTTC is not ε-stable. Since it is efficient, it should
fail to be ϕ-stable. Therefore, there should be a student, si, that can fairly
object µMO via some matching, say µ′. Then, µ′ must satisfy that
ρsiµ′(si) < ρsiµTTC(si) ≤ ρsiµMO(si),
which implies that µ′ is unstable. Note that this instability implies that there
should be a student, say sh, and matching µ
′′ such that sh can counter-object
µ′ via µ′′. A contradiction.  
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